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THESIS DISCLAIMER
This thesis is a preliminary analysis of the effects of deployment rates on the
overall effectiveness of a strategic defense. The thesis uses one basic set of
assumptions about a possible threat and a possible defense. Although a model
developed at RAND was used to obtain data on which the analysis could be based,
this is not a RAND product.
It is not intended that this work itself be the basis of policy decisions but that
other analysts may wish to extend and use what is presented here. By using various
threat forecasts and defense system parameters, it will be possible to determine the true
impact of deployment decisions on the effectiveness of a strategic defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
Much of the recent public discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative has been
of the nature of "What can we build and how soon can we build it?" This thesis will
illuminate the question "If we think we know what we want to build, how fast should
we build it?" It is not the intention here to give the definitive answer to this question,
but to offer a methodology for answering it. This thesis will consider appropriate
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) 1 for a boost-phase strategic defense layer, develop a
model which can be used to evaluate deployment decisions for such a layer, present
sample results, and offer conclusions and recommendations for future planning.
Although the methodology is demonstrated here for a space-based layer consisting of




The United States currently has no defense against ballistic missile attack. On
23 March 1983, President Reagan called for a concerted effort by America's scientific
and engineering community to find a way to render such missiles "impotent and
obsolete." [Ref. 1] The U.S. effort to meet the President's request is known as the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Defense Department agency created to
consolidate and carry forward the various ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs of
the individual Armed Services is the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO).
In its 1986 Report to the Congress, the SDIO stated its mission as
to provide the technical knowledge required to support an informed decision in
the early 1990s on whether or not to develop and deploy a defense of the U.S.
and its Allies against ballistic missiles [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1],
If a decision to develop and deploy a comprehensive defense against ballistic
missiles were unable to be made until the early 1990s, it is likely that actual
deployment would not begin until around the year 2000. Yet a technical panel from
*A complete glossary of acronyms is at Appendix A.
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the George C. Marshall Institute in Washington, D.C. published its findings in January
1987 that
technical progress in SDIO in the last two years has invalidated this traditional
view. Several independent studies indicate that a space-based defense, attacking
missiles in their boost phase, can be deployed in the the same time frame as the
ground-based layers of the defense [Ref. 3: pp. 3-4]. (i.e., by 1994)
Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger indicated in May 1987 that
no major technical roadblocks remain that would prevent initial U.S. deployment
of a first-phase, layered, ballistic missile defense as early as 1993 . . . [Ref. 4].
This position is based in part on SDIO's own 1986 statement that
in space-based kinetic energy weapons for boost-phase intercept, we have defined
a concept for a simple chemical rocket based on low risk attainable technology at
an affordable cost that would be effective in a near term defense [Ref. 2: p. 11-11].
The possibility of an early decision on deployment prompts an examination of the
effectiveness of such a system and how its deployment schedule might affect its
effectiveness.
2. Technical
The trajectory of a ballistic missile, whether it is a land-based intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), consists of
four phases: boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal. Boost phase includes the
time from missile launch to the burn-out of the missile's booster stages above the
atmosphere. During this time, the hot exhaust gases can easily be detected and tracked
by infra-red (IR) sensors on surveillance and tracking satellites in high orbits. If the
missile is equipped with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles, they are all
carried on a post-boost vehicle (PBV) or "bus" on the missile throughout the boost
phase. The post-boost phase begins after booster burnout, when the PBV maneuvers
very precisely to place its reentry vehicles (RV) one by one in exact trajectories toward
their targets. The IR signatures of the PBV's maneuvering jets are not as intense as
when the missile was boosting in the atmosphere, but are nonetheless detectable
against the cold background of space. As each RV is inserted into its trajectory by the
PBV, it enters the midcourse phase of its flight. When all the PBV have dispensed all
of their RV, the post-boost phase is over. The individual RV are now on ballistic
paths to their targets and do no further maneuvering, thus giving off no appreciable IR
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signature and becoming more difficult to locate. When the RV reenters the
atmosphere, the terminal phase of its flight begins. The RV is constructed to protect
the nuclear warhead inside it from the effects of atmospheric friction, and when the RV
arrives at its target, the warhead detonates.
The U.S.S.R. has the only operational ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
in the world today. It is designed to intercept RV in the terminal phase of their flights.
The U.S. began to build such a system in the 1970s, but decided that a BMD that
intercepted RV only in the terminal phase could be too easily overwhelmed by
offensive proliferation, and so never deployed the system. Recent advances in
technology, however, have made it potentially feasible to intercept RV throughout
their flight, from launch to impact, thus reducing the load on a terminal defense. In
particular, it may be possible to intercept and destroy ICBM and SLBM in the boost
phase, when all the RV are still on board the booster or PBV, thus gaining enormous
leverage over an attacking force. These interceptions may continue through the post-
boost and midcourse phases as well.
The means for interception during the boost and post-boost phases could be
satellites equipped with kinetic energy weapons such as rockets or electromagnetic rail
guns, or with directed energy weapons such as lasers or particle beams. These same
weapons could be used to accomplish the midcourse mission, along with very-high-
altitude interceptor rockets launched from the ground. Such a layered defense,
intercepting attacking ICBM and SLBM throughout the 2000 or so seconds of their
flights, might reduce an attacker's confidence in suppressing retaliation. This might be
sufficient to deter the initial attack.
One possible method of accomplishing boost-phase intercept might be with
the Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle (SBKKV). The SBKKV is similar to the Anti-
Satellite missile developed for launch from the U.S. Air Force F- 15 fighter plane
[Ref. 5: p. 35]. An SBKKV would be a small one- or two-stage rocket with an IR
seeker to home in on the exhaust gases of a boosting ICBM or a maneuvering PBV,
and would destroy its target and all the RV on board by simple -collision at high speed.
Any number of SBKKV could be carried on a launcher satellite platform, though most
public proposals consider from 5 to 25 SBKKV per platform. SBKKV would be
alerted, targeted, and fired by battle management2 satellites, and surveillance and
tracking satellites would alert the battle management satellites.
Battle management is the process of deciding which SBKKV should be launched
against which targets.
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There are many potential countermeasures to the various layers of a
comprehensive BMD system. Some ways for an attacking force to avoid being
intercepted by SBKKV include attacking the surveillance and battle management
satellites, attacking the SBKKV platforms, and changing the flight characteristics of the
ICBM and SLBM to make them less vulnerable to interception. Possible means to
avoid interception during midcourse include the deployment of penetration aids from
the PBV at the same time that it dispenses the RV. These penetration aids could
include chaff and light and heavy decoys to overwhelm the midcourse tracking and
battle management systems with many thousands of potential targets, only a few of
which would actually be carrying nuclear warheads. To overwhelm terminal defenses,
attacks could be coordinated so that many RV arrive over the target at once. Also,
RV might be able to maneuver to escape ground-launched terminal interceptors.
The most frequently mentioned potential counter to the boost phase use of
SBKKV is the so-called Fast-Burn Booster (FBB). This would be a ballistic missile
designed and built to complete its boost phase in much less time than missiles currently
in the world's arsenals. Such a booster would reach its full speed much sooner than a
conventional booster, and so be able to send its payload of RV on the PBV at high
speed through a SBKKV defense layer. This would reduce the time of vulnerability for
the RV by enabling them to be deployed sooner from the maneuvering PBV with its
tell-tale IR signature, thus avoiding IR sensors. 3 The FBB must not burn out at too
low an altitude, though, else the PBV and deploying RV will be subject to atmospheric
drag and lose accuracy [Ref. 7: p. 177].
An FBB would, however, have the disadvantage of the additional weight of
materials required to strengthen it against the internal stresses resulting from higher
acceleration and against the greater external forces of atmospheric resistance at higher
speeds. This weight penalty would reduce its potential payload from the 10 RV
currently carried by the world's largest ICBiM to a maximum of perhaps 3 RV
[Refs. 2,8: pp. VI-12, 17]. The weight penalty would also reduce the number of
penetration aids that could be carried on board the PBV, thus reducing the midcourse
discrimination problem for the defense. Another disadvantage of a FBB is that the
It might be possible to overcome dependence on IR tracking by using homing
radars on each KKV. However, to equip SBKKV with radar homing devices may not
be practical due to the additional weight and power requirements, to the confusion
which would result if many SBKKV were to be illuminating their targets at the same
frequency simultaneously, and to the problem of strengthening the radar components
to survive 20 g acceleration.
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necessary sensor, feedback, and engine thrust controls are beyond current technology
and would be very expensive and time-consuming to develop [Ref. 8: p. 15].
C. IMPLICATIONS
One of the problems facing U.S. development and deployment of a
comprehensive BMD system is that the U.S.S.R. can begin to take countermeasures
before the U.S. system is fully deployed. The key to a capable and worthwhile U.S.
defense system is to anticipate Soviet responses to ensure that the system will continue to
be able to perform its mission in the future. The potential for FBB to be one of those
responses is real: "SDI officials believe the Soviets could develop fast-burn technology
within seven years," [Ref. 9: p. 29] i.e., by 1994.
A Soviet FBB development date of 1994 coincides with the potential start of
early deployment for a near-term U.S. defense if the decision were made in 1987 to
proceed with full-scale development. However, an initial Soviet fast-burn capability
developed by 1994 would not negate the value of a near-term U.S. boost and post-
boost phase defense based on SBKKV. Just as the U.S. defense will take years to fully
deploy, additions of significant numbers of FBB or conversion of the Soviet
conventional missile force to FBB will also take years. In the interim, the vast bulk of
Soviet ICBM and SLBM will continue to be of the older slower models, and this is a
force against which the U.S. still will have to defend effectively.
This thesis develops a systems analysis approach to study the time-phased
interaction of threats and defenses. In Chapter II, possible measures of effectiveness
are examined to find one which is most appropriate for the boost phase subsystem of
an overall defense system. In Chapter III, the results of simulations of static
interactions are applied and a computer program is developed to model the dynamic
process of defensive deployment and offensive penetration. In order to deal with the
random failures of real-world equipment, the computer program incorporates the
results of a probabilistic analysis of ICBM/PBV survival. Chapter IV presents the
optimization of start date and deployment rates to achieve the desired level of
effectiveness throughout the lifetime of the system. Analysis of the sensitivity of the
results to the effectiveness of the individual KKV is also conducted. The sensitivity of
SBKKV layer effectiveness to deployment delays, smoothed production/deployment
schedules, and reliance on the Space Shuttle are also demonstrated.
The conclusions reached in Chapter V are generally applicable to various
strategic defense systems and layers. The methodology developed is independent of any
14
particular threat forecast or engagement simulation model. Analysts will be able to
apply this approach with different inputs to support long-range studies and decisions.
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II. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A. GENERAL
Before the effectiveness of a BMD system can be discussed, it is first necessary to
address measures of effectiveness in general, measures of BMD system effectiveness,
and the inputs to that effectiveness. An operational definition of an MOE is that it
tells us how well we are doing in making decisions, and how well pleased we are
with the outcomes resulting from our actions. This lets us rank the outcomes
from alternative courses of action . . . ." [Ref. 10: p. 1]
Complex and expensive systems such as BMD particularly need valid MOEs in order
to show when optimal (or even satisfactory) results have been achieved from the
system by changing various inputs. The selection of an MOE is often complicated
because
(1) there are usually several possible MOEs, (2) it is useful to compare them in a
given study, in particular to see if conclusions change when different MOEs are
used, especially since (3) the choice between MOEs is sometimes only a
subjective matter [Ref 11].
B. BMD EFFECTIVENESS
In a strategic sense, the true MOE of a U.S. BMD is whether it helps deter
nuclear war. Since it is impossible to measure the relationships of all possible inputs to
deterrence, of which a BMD would be only one, the effectiveness of a U.S. BMD has
been proposed to be measured in other ways. One author has suggested that BMD
effectiveness be measured in terms of surviving U.S. ICBM retaliatory capability
[Ref. 12: p. 64]. Often the proposed MOE is the percentage of attacking RV
intercepted and destroyed by the defense, but percentages are meaningless without
knowledge of the total number of RV that were launched. Efficiency, in terms of the
cost-exchange ratio of RV killed per SBKKV in orbit, is another possible MOE,
although we should remember that in many situations, "efficiency can be the mortal
enemy of effectiveness [Ref. 13]." The SDIO has stated its MOE as follows:
low leakage of nuclear warheads when threatened by large, sophisticated attacks
as well as attacks on the defense system itself [Ref. 2: p. V-l].
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That is an overall BMD system MOE, but the system will consist of several
layers. Accordingly, "there exists a hierarchy of MOE's . . . ." [Ref. 10: p. 3]. The
midcourse defense will be designed to receive those RV which leak through the SBKKV
layer, so the MOE for the SBKKV layer should be measured in terms of absolute
numbers (not percentages) of RV acceptable to the midcourse layer. Furthermore, the
cost of a space-based defense layer and the changing nature of the threat over time
dictate that this MOE be evaluated not by a snapshot of performance when final
operational capability (FOC) is reached, but continuously from the beginning of
SBKKV deployment.
The Marshall Institute studied a BMD system composed of three layers: SBKKV
as the first layer, ground-launched high-altitude rocket interceptor KKV for the
midcourse layer, and ground-launched low-altitude rocket interceptor KKV for
terminal defense. When this system reached its FOC, there would be 11,000 SBKKV in
orbit, and these SBKKV would be able to intercept 76% of 11,200 RV launched in an
all-out attack [Ref. 3: p. 40]. This amounts to an absolute number of 2688 RV
penetrating the SBKKV layer and entering the midcourse phase of their flights. Given
the stature of the Marshall Institute study, it was felt that 2688 would be a valid
objective for the maximum number of RV allowed 'to penetrate the SBKKV layer in
the present study.4 Accordingly, the present study looks at the performance of a boost
and post-boost defense layer (consisting of SBKKV on satellite platforms) with a
maximum leakage of 2688 RV challenged by an evolving Soviet threat over the years
1994 to 2004 inclusive.
C. INPUTS TO THE MOE
Penetration of the defense layer by attacking RV happens as the result of
engagements. An engagement is characterized by the date the attack occurs, the threat
at that time, and the number of SBKKV in orbit. Other primary, secondary, and
tertiary inputs are as follows (the f, g's, and h's denote functional relationships):
4
Actually, the maximum number allowable through the first layer depends on the
capabilities of the second and third layers to reduce that leakage to some (presumably
much smaller) final level, and those capabilities may change over time. Whatever level
of effectiveness is finally required of the space-based layer, the methodology developed
here still can be applied.
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MOE value = f(current and previous SBKKV deployment rates, SBKKV deployment
start date, space-based defense layer system reliability, year of engagement, desired
level of confidence in the layer's performance, surface in SBKKV x YEAR x Re-
targeted space)
• deployment rates = gl(space launch capacity, SBKKV platform size and
weight, platform production, budget and political considerations)
• start date = g2(technical progress, mass production capability, budget and
political considerations)
• system reliability = g3(probability that a KKV will hit its target (p(k)),
reliability of all other components)
• year of engagement = g4(political considerations)
• surface = g5(threat, defensive system, launch time of day)
threat = hl(ICBM and SLBM booster types, number of RV per booster
type, booster burnout times by type, individual RV deployment times from
PBV, number of attacking boosters of different types, locations of ICBM
launch fields by type, number of ICBM in each launch field, targets and
trajectories, booster technology and production development rate, BMD
suppression capability)
defensive system = h2(number of orbital rings, number of platforms per
ring, number of KKV per platform, KKV acceleration, KKV fmal velocity,
angle of orbital inclination, phasing fraction (or phasing angle), platform
altitude, system reaction time, system survivability)
launch time of day = h3(time of least defensive coverage, military
considerations, political considerations)
Some of the above-listed factors are unknown and unknowable, e.g. future
political and budgetary considerations. The rest can be set as either fixed parameters,
parameters to be varied to examine their effects on the MOE, or decision variables.
The decision variables are under the control of decisionmakers and can be varied in
order to optimize the measure of effectiveness relative to the parameters. For this
study, the yearly deployment rates are the decision variables. The parameters varied to
produce different conditions are the KKV p(k) and the desired confidence level. The




The modeling effort began with the initial insight that the number of RV that
would penetrate a boost and post-boost phase defense depended on the number and
type of RV that were launched and the number of SBKKV available (all other factors
held .constant). In particular, for a specific threat mix of RV on various boosters, a
convex curve would probably best describe the relationship between the (independent)
number of SBKKV deployed and the (dependent) number of RV penetrating. This
curve would start at some maximum when no SBKKV were deployed (and all RV
launched would penetrate), decline as SBKKV were added, and finally exhibit
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Figure 3.1 POSTULATED RV PENETRATION CURVE.
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Furthermore, this sort of curve would describe the relationship between SBKKV
deployed and RV penetrating for any threat, with variations in maximum due to total
number of RV launched, and changes in curvature due to the mix of booster types as
the threat changed over time. Thus, each year from 1994 to 2004 could be described
by a particular curve in the SBKKV x RV plane, and if an orthogonal axis were to
describe the year of the engagement, a surface would result directly relating the number
of SBKKV deployed and the year of the engagement to the number of RV penetrating the
SBKKV layer.
The number of SBKKV available to participate in the defense in any particular
year would be a function of the year the SBKKV were first deployed and the annual
rate of further deployments. Thus, given a surface which would reflect assumptions
about the change in the threat over time and the performance of SBKKV against such
threats, it would be possible to directly relate decisions about deployment start date and
deployment rate to the MOE, number of RV penetrating the SBKKV layer. This
concept is graphically demonstrated in Appendix E.
B. GENERATING THE TARGETING SURFACE
1. Assumptions
a. Threat
From the previous discussion, it is clear that different assumptions about
the magnitude of the attacking force and its mix of booster types over time will result
in different surfaces in SBKKV x YEAR x RV space. For the purposes of this study,
only one surface was needed in order to demonstrate the approach, and so only one
Soviet development and launch scenario was prepared.
Although SBKKV would be effective against both ICBM and SLBM in the
boost and post-boost phases of their flights^ SLBM were not considered in this study
due to the lack of available information about their flight characteristics, the
imprecision of their launching areas, and the likelihood that the initial effort to develop
FBB would be for land-based missiles. It should be noted that the SBKKV in the
vicinity of the Soviet land mass defending against ICBM would not be facing a
significant number of SLBM and that SLBM and their PBV would be engaged by
SBKKV located over other parts of the globe, so the results of this study are robust in
the face of this decision. Larger, more comprehensive modeling efforts with access to
accurate data about SLBM would certainly need to include them.
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The issue of system survivability against direct attack was considered an
unnecessary complication of the basic effort of this study. Relative to system
survivability then, the results of this study will be optimistic. The assumption of
perfect survival would have to be investigated before any future study based on the
methodology presented here could be considered valid for production/deployment
decisions.
It was further decided not to model all-out first strikes5 with every ICBM
in the projected Soviet inventories. Of the ICBM in the forecast inventories, only two-
thirds of each type would be used in the model engagements, except that all of the FBB
would be used. The reasons for this assumption were:
• It is not likely that the Soviets would leave themselves without some sort of
ICBM capability for use against- other nuclear powers in the event of general
nuclear war, particularly if the SS-20 and similar longer range intermediate-
range missiles are reduced or eliminated.
• Soviet military science, while stressing the importance of overwhelming initial
nuclear strikes, also stresses the need for readily and continuously available
reserve forces.
.
• It is not likely that the Strategic Rocket Forces would have a force size so small
that they would be required to cede the nuclear strike role entirely to the Navy
and Long Range Aviation for the duration of a war.
• The sole purpose of the FBB would be to penetrate the SBKKV layer in the
initial strike, so none of them would be held in reserve.
This assumption does not affect the validity of the methodology, did reduce the
number of SBKKV needed, and did simplify the model.
It was further assumed that, if a U.S. decision to develop a BMD were
made, the Soviets would fmd it in their best interests to allow treaty limitations on the
numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic launchers to lapse. Furthermore, it was
assumed that any new missiles developed would be mobile, so would not need the
SS-18 and SS-19 silos, and so SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM would not be retired as new
missiles entered the Soviet inventory. The other missiles in the scenario for this study
were the SS-24, the SS-25, the SS-18 follow-on (FO) [Ref. 14: p. 31], and a notional
FBB. Future production rates were assumed by using approximate annual missile
production for the years 1978- 1986. 6
5Soviet military doctrine states that the U.S.S.R. will not be an aggressor, but a
preemptive strike is not ruled out if they believe an attack on them is imminent.
6Total Soviet ICBM production for that period was 1525, which averages to 170
per year [Refs. 14,15,16: pp. 122, 98, 79].
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RV loads were assumed as follows: SS-18 - 10, SS-19 - 6, SS-24 - .10,
SS-25 - 1, SS-18FO - 10, FBB - 3. Booster burnout times were assumed to range from
almost 300 seconds for the oldest missiles down to 50 seconds for the FBB. Where
information about particular Soviet missiles was unavailable, approximations based on
the characteristics of similar U.S. missiles were used. PBV deployment times for each
RV were assumed to range from about 50 seconds for the oldest missiles down to 30
seconds for the FBB [Refs. 6,17: pp. 22,25]. Geographic coordinates for thirteen
launch sites were selected based on the maps in Soviet Military Power and an atlas of
the Soviet Union [Ref. 14: p. 25]. The implication is that, given the locations of fixed
silo fields and known mobile ICBM launching areas, battle management satellites will
know which boosters are carrying the most warheads and be able to properly assign
KKV against the most dangerous boosters.
In order to gain the most information from available computing resources,
threat mixtures were modeled for the years 1994, 1995, 1999, and 2004. A complete
table of the threats modeled is at Appendix B.
b. SBKKV Layer
The SBKKV were assumed to be deployed 10 to a platform at an altitude
of 557 kilometers in orbital rings of 20 platforms per ring inclined at 85 degrees from
the equator. The SBKKV were assumed to have a 20 g acceleration rate, and a fmal
velocity of 6 km/sec [Ref. 3: p. 20], which implied about 31 seconds of acceleration.
The salvo size was chosen to be one KKV per target, rather than two. Shoot-look-
shoot targeting was deemed impractical for a system facing so many targets moving so
fast, and firing a salvo of two KKV per target with a high probability of kill (p(k)) for
each KKV would have been wasteful of assets. The time required after ICBM launch
for target acquisition, tracking, battle management, and communications was assumed
to be 50 seconds. All KKV were then launched at once. Even though SBKKV may
have some capability against RV in midcourse, it was. decided to limit the modeling to
the boost and post-boost phases only, due to the entirely different targeting problems
faced in midcourse as a result of decoys and chaff.7




Having determined the engagement scenarios to be modeled, an
engagement simulation developed in 1983 at the RAND Corporation by H. Hoover
and M. Miller was used to generate the actual targeting surface in SBKKV x YEAR x
RV space. It is a deterministic model, with no random inputs at all. Knowing which
boosters are launched from which locations at which time, it tracks the spatial
relationships between all the platforms of a SBKKV constellation and all the ICBM
and PBV, in time-steps of 10 seconds. Having recorded all occasions when an
interception could have been made during this time, it then uses an application of the
transportation problem of linear programming to assign SBKKV on a one-for-one
basis8 to prioritized targets (ICBM or PBV) which are within range. The objective of
these assignments is to use all KKV which will be in range of targets to maximize the
number of RV (not just boosters) which would have been destroyed if the system
worked perfectly, subject to the limits on available KKV.9 The number of RV targeted
in the engagement is the output of the model.
By reporting the number of RV which could be destroyed, the simulation in
effect assumes perfect reliability of all defense subsystems from surveillance through
acquisition, tracking, battle management, communications, and KKV. This
characteristic of the model can be exploited to allow various p(k) to be applied to the
results later, in order to glean more information from its output about the effectiveness
of a space-based defense layer. This will be discussed further in Section III-C
(Complete Model).
In order to gain the most information about the shape of the postulated
curves in the RV x SBKKV plane, the numbers of platforms modeled were: 100, 200,
300, 500, 700, 1000, 1300, 1500, and 2000. These choices emphasized the parts of the
curves believed to be most sensitive to variations in the number of platforms.
8Recall that KKV salvo size was set at one.
9For a given SBKKV, this procedure would, for example, prefer a partially-empty
SS-18 PBV with 8 RV still on board to a still-boosting SS-19 with all 6 RV on board.
However, this procedure would not preclude a KKV from being targeted at a 1-RV




The 4 different threat year-mixes (shown in Appendix B) and 9 SBKKV
platform levels provided for 36 output values on the targeting surface in SBKKV x
YEAR x RV space. Further inputs for all the runs for this particular study were:
each platform carried 10 KKV
KKV acceleration of 20 g (196 m/sec2)
KKV final velocity of 6 km/sec
salvo size of 1 KKV per target
platform altitude of 557 km [Ref. 18]
20 equally-spaced platforms per orbital ring
number of rings in the constellation (in this study, the number of rings for any
given run equalled the number of platforms * 20)
85 degree inclination of the orbits relative to the equator [Ref. 18]
zero phasing fraction (i.e., when one ring had a satellite over the equator, all
rings did) [Ref. 18]
50 second delay from ICBM launch to KKV launch
geographic coordinates for the 13 ICBM launch fields
RV target areas in the center of the U.S. (this was sufficiently accurate for this
study, which did not track the RV into the midcourse phase) [Ref. 18]
near-minimum energy trajectories [Ref. 18]
burnout times for the different types of boosters
RV deployment times for the different types of boosters
initial number of RV launched on each type of PBV
for this study, all ICBM were launched simultaneously on each run, and the
launch occurred for each run when one of the SBKKV platforms was over
degrees latitude, degrees longitude, thus maintaining consistency among all
runs [Ref. 18].
Dr. Miller used his model and the above inputs to provide the 36 raw data points
needed to generate the targeting surface in SBKKV x YEAR x RV space.
c. Outputs
Each run produced the number of RV targeted for destruction before
entering midcourse. 10 The results of each run are shown in Table 1. Since all types of
10
It should be noted that these results are sensitive to different ICBM launch
times relative to the location of an "index platform," and coverage could be less or
more complete at different times (i.e., when the index platform is not at - when the
ICBM are launched). This variation, however, is reduced as more and more platforms
are deployed. The time for one of these constellations to repeat itself when 100
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conventional ICBM (but no FBB) were launched in 1994, and since a sufficiently dense
constellation of platforms (2000) was able to target all of them, it is concluded that the
KKV are capable of intercepting all PBV either while still on their boosters or before
dispensing any of their RV. It is also concluded that, since the scenario added only
FBB to the Soviet inventory after 1999, and yet the number of RV targeted in 2004 is
the same as in 1999 for any number of SBKKV platforms, that the RV from FBB were
always deployed before the first KKV could have arrived.
TABLE 1
RAW DATA ON RV TARGETED (FROM RAND MODEL)
PLATFORMS YEARS
1994 1995 1999 2004
100 1340 1340 1440 1440
200 2330 2340 2610 2610
300 3040 3130 3690 3690
500 3700 3990 5490 5490
700 4010 4370 6340 6340
1000 4260 4750 7050 7050
1300 4340 4900 7510 7510
1500 4350 4950 7760 7760
2000 4360 5020 8030 8030
Plots of the RV not targeted, which are the difference between RVLNCH
and RVTGT, are shown by year in Figure 3.2. These plots confirm the initial insight
of Chapter III.
3. Fitting the Surface
A targeted RV surface of 220 points in SBKKV x YEAR x RV space for the
years 1994-2004, and for SBKKV platform deployments in integral multiples of 100
from 100 to 2000 was derived using GRAFSTAT. 11 Initial investigation of the 36 raw
jdata points revealed that, when plotted in the SBKKV x RV plane, a 6th degree
polynomial provided the best fit to the data between 100 and 1500 platforms and that
platforms (5 rings) are in orbit is 288 minutes, and when 2000 (100 rings) are in orbit it
is only 14 minutes [Ref. 18].
H
"GRAFSTAT is an interactive data analysis and plotting tool" which is
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Figure 3.2 RV PENETRATING BECAUSE NOT TARGETED.
straight lines would be satisfactory between and 100 platforms12 and between 1500
and 2000 platforms. Also, when plotted in the YEAR x RV plane, the data were best
described by a 2d degree polynomial from 1994 to 1999, and parallel lines from 1999 to
2004 (reflecting the inability to target the FBB). See Figure 3.3.
Two converging approaches were used to obtain the RV values for the 184
SBKKV x YEAR intersections not explicitly given by the model output:
• interpolate the three13 9x4 constant-year plots to obtain three 20 x 4 data
plots in the SBKKV x RV plane, and then transform them into 4 x 20 constant-
platform plots in the YEAR x RV plane to obtain the six complete 11 x 20 data
points in Figure 3.4.
• interpolate the nine 4x9 constant-platform plots in the YEAR x RV plane to
obtain nine 11x9 data plots and transform them into eleven 9x11 constant-
year -plots in the SBKKV x RV plane to obtain the complete 20 x 11 data
points in Figure 3.4.
12Results for less than 100 platforms (5 rings) are not significant anyway due to
lack, of coverage.
13Remember that the data for 2004 duplicated 1999.
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The results were almost identical (no differences greater than 3 RV), so they were
averaged to obtain the data presented in Table 2. The surface appears in a three-
dimensional plot in Figure 3.5. The points were entered into the data file TARGET
for reference by the program developed in Subsection III-C-3, Programming.
C. COMPLETE MODEL
1. Binomial Distribution of Interceptions
The SBKKV x YEAR x RV targeting surface was generated from data which
considered all possibilities for RV interception14 and implied a total defense system
reliability and KKV p(k) of 1.0. A realistic view of the situation being modeled requires
the application of a p(k) less than 1.0 to determine the actual number of RV
penetrating the SBKKV layer (RVPEN). That is,
RVPEN * RVLNCH - RVTGT,
because
RVTGT = RVHIT + RVMISSED,
where RVTGT (the RAND model output) is limited by the number of KKV available
and within range. 15 Thus,
RVPEN = (RVLNCH - RVTGT) + (RVTGT - RVHIT).
The data give the value of RVTGT outright as a result of the mechanics of the input
parameters, thus explicitly determining the value of RVLNCH — RVTGT. It is the
value of RVHIT which is subject to random effects. At first glance, it might appear
that the value of RVHIT could be considered a straightforward Binomial random
variable with parameters RVTGT and, some overall probability of RV destruction as
the parameters. This, however, is not the case, because the Binomial distribution
requires independence of individual events, and RV are not destroyed independently.
KKV destroy RV in groups of 10 or 6 or however many are on the booster when it is
intercepted.
14Note that whether or not an RV can be targeted is determined solely by the
mechanics of the boosters, orbits, and SBKKV once the ICBM are launched. The
launch time will presumably be chosen by an attacker to minimize the number of
possible interceptions by launching when gaps or minimum coverage occur based on
knowledge of the platform orbits and his own ICBM trajectories.
15There will almost always be more conventional boosters launched than KKV
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Figure 3.4 THE INTERPOLATED TARGETING DATA.
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Figure 3.5 THE TARGETED RV SURFACE.
KKV intercept of a booster results in RV destruction, so the total number of
RV destroyed depends on the number and type (SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25,
SS-18FO)16 of boosters intercepted and the number of RV carried on each intercepted
booster. That is,
RVHIT = L (RV.) x (BHITj),
where i indicates booster type and the BHITj are random variables. Recalling that an
earlier assumption was that only one KKV would be fired at each targeted booster, the
number of boosters intercepted of each type thus depends directly on the number of
KKV fired at boosters of each type and the p(k) of a KKV against each different type
of booster. At this point, we have independent Bernoulli trials: either a KKV hits a
targeted booster or it does not, independently of other KKV. 17 Thus, for each type of
16 Recall that the KKV were unable to target any of the FBB.
17This assumption is not entirely conservative, because an entire platform of 10
KKV could fail or be destroyed (thus losing independence among the KKV), and the
reliability of the surveillance, tracking, and battle management satellites is also assumed
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booster, the number intercepted is a Binomial random variable:
BHITj ~ Bin (BTGTj, p(ty),
where i refers to booster type. At this point, RVHIT is a function of five random
variables with ten parameters, and further simplifying assumptions are needed. We will
regroup the boosters from their five types into three categories: those carrying 10 RV
(SS-18, SS-24, SS-18FO), those carrying 6 RV (SS-19), and those carrying 1 RV
(SS-25), 18 and assume that the KKV p(k) is the same for all booster types.
RVHIT is now a function of three Binomial random variables, with only four
different parameters:
RVHIT = (10) (Bin(BTGT10 , p(k))) + (6) (Bin(BTGT6 , p(k)))
+ (1) (BiitfBTGTp p(k))).




and BTGTj, we proceed as
follows: The number and category of boosters targeted during each engagement are
derived from the SBKKV x YEAR x RV data and knowledge of the scenario and the
characteristics of the RAND model. As noted earlier, RVLNCH and RVTGT are
explicitly determined by the input launch scenario and the interpolated RV targeting
data. The difference is the number of RV which were not targeted and thus made a
"clean escape." It was earlier noted that all RV from FBB penetrated the SBKKV
layer. Since the raw data indicated that all the conventional boosters were potentially
vulnerable, those RV which are not targeted and thus make a clean escape (other than
FBB RV) will be those from boosters with the least targeting priority. The least
priority boosters are the SS-25s, with only one RV on board, followed by the SS-19s,
with six RV on board. The top priority boosters are the 10-RV SS-18s, SS-24s, and
SS-18FOs. Thus, the number and mix of targeted boosters can be determined by
iteratively subtracting the low-priority RV launched in the scenario from the total
number of RV which escaped, and comparing the result with the known numbers and
mix of launchers in the attack. It will be recalled from previous data that the boosters
targeted will be carrying full loads of 10, 6, or 1 RV when they are intercepted.
to be perfect. This assumption does, however, result in a lower bound on the number
of SBKKV required for this scenario and MOE-level. More detailed modeling would
have to be done in order to describe more precisely the effects and likelihood of
imperfect support system operation or platform failure.
18This simplification is valid because the raw data indicated that all conventional
boosters were vulnerable, because the model puts a priority on the 10-warhead
boosters, and because the KKV p(k) is assumed to be the same for all boosters.
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The random variable RVHITj does not retain the Binomial probability law
when the Binomial random variable BHITj is transformed by scalar multiplication.
Multiplication by the constant RV; transforms the elements but not the size of the
sample space over which BHITj is defmed. Furthermore, while the random variable
RVHITj has mean (RV.) (BTGT.) (p(k)), its variance is not (RV.)
(BTGTj) (p(k) (1 - p(k)), which would indicate a Binomial distribution, but
(RVj)2 (BTGTj) (p(k)) (1 - p(k)). We turn to the Normal approximation of the
Binomial random variable BHIT-:
i
BHITj ~ Bin(BTGTj, p(k)) -+ ~ N((BTGT.Xp(k)), (BTGT) (p(k)) (1 - p(k)))
The Normal approximation to the Binomial distribution is valid here due to the large
numbers of boosters targeted after the first few platforms (carrying 10 KKV apiece)
have been deployed. The Normal distribution has the useful property of reproducing
itself under linear transformations. Therefore,
RVHIT; ~ N((RV.) (BTGTj) (p(k)), (RV.)2 (BTGTj) (p(k)) (1 - p(k))),
and
RVHIT ~ N(L (RV.) (BTGTj) (p(k)), E (RV;)2 (BTGT.) (p(k)) (1 - p(k))),
with mean




)(p(k))(l - p(k)) + (36)(BTGT
6
)(p(k))(l - p(k))
+ (BTGTjX^^Xl - p(k)).
Note that for each engagement, the parameters of RVHIT will be different.
2. Confidence Interval
a. Defender's View
A BMD system is a critical system which must meet or exceed its design
standards the one time it is needed.20 Since RVPEN = RVLNCH - RVHIT, and
RVHIT is well approximated by the Normal distribution, the expected value of
RVPEN is also its median. A defender might wish to set a security goal positively
19
It can be argued that there will be occasions when very few six- or one-RV
boosters will be deployed, and that the Normal approximation is not valid for the
distribution of BHIT for those categories on those occasions. However, those
occurrences happen when all 10-RV boosters, or all 10-RV and 6-RV boosters, have
already been targeted. In the aggregate, the approximation is still good.
20The present study does not address the situation of a conflict extended in time,
with its consequent changes in attacking force mix and size and defending SBKKV
platforms still functioning and with KKV on board.
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under his control. To set the required level of effectiveness at the expected value of
RVPEN would be to use the 50th percentile of the distribution; this would be very
risky for a one-time system, as there would be a 50% chance that the required level of
effectiveness would not be achieved. To be more certain of achieving his security goal,
the defender would need to deploy SBKKV in sufficient numbers that a greater-
than-50% upper one-sided confidence interval for the number of RV which penetrate
the SBKKV layer can be achieved.This will be a level above the mean of RVPEN
which is not likely to be exceeded. For any required confidence level, the number of
SBKKV on station can be adjusted to achieve any desired RVPEN value, as
determined by the Normal distribution of RVPEN.
b. Attacker's View
The attacker's view of such- a random outcome is different. One goal in
launching a first strike would be to prevent retaliation. The attacker would want a
high degree of confidence that the defender's retaliatory capability will be suppressed.
Thus, for a given engagement, he will set a threshold for RVPEN well below the mean
in order to increase the chance that enough RV will penetrate the boost-phase defense
layer to accomplish suppression and any other objectives of the attack. His threshold
will be the limit of a lower one-sided confidence interval for RVPEN. The risk he is
willing to accept will be a that RVPEN will not exceed this amount. A defender might
wish to deploy merely enough SBKKV on station that the attacker will be unable to
achieve this goal with his desired degree of confidence, so that the attacker will be
deterred.21 Fewer SBKKV are required for this mission, however the price paid is that
the defender no longer is positively controlling his own security, but is trying to
manage the perceptions of his potential opponent. Additionally, if an attacker were to
acquire a BMD capability, his confidence in a successful attack at a lower threshold of
RVPEN would increase, as his BMD system would negate most or all of any
retaliatory strike. The defender would be forced to react to this new lower threshold
and quickly deploy more SBKKV in order to again reduce the attacker's confidence in
success.
21The defender's decision on the number of SBKKV needed to deter depends, of
course, on knowledge or assumptions about the attacker's success threshold, the
attacker's desired degree of confidence in achieving that threshold, and the attacker's
opinion of the capabilities of the defense layer.
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3. Programming
Once the SBKKV x YEAR x RV targeting surface was established through
simulation and interpolation, it remained to write a program to relate SBKKV
deployment rates to RV penetrating the SBKKV defense layer in any year 1994-2004.
VS FORTRAN was chosen as the language for this program, due to its universality
and transportability, should others wish to apply it with their own inputs.
The program begins with a DATA statement so the user can set his desired
value for the KKV's p(k), for the value of Z needed to achieve the desired confidence
interval, and the deployment start date to be used. The program then reads the entire
targeting surface data file (TARGET) and a short file (LAUNCH) which contains the
(potential) number of attacking RV at the end of each year 1993-2004. It then reads
an input file with the user-determined platform deployment rates per month for the
years 1994-2004 and computes and stores the number of SBKKV platforms deployed
for each month from January 1994 to December 2004.
Then for each engagement, month by month until January 2005 or a platform
value greater than 2000 is reached, the following sequence of computations is
performed:
• the number of RV and boosters launched is computed by category (10, 6, 3, or
1 RV per booster)
• the total number of RV targeted is obtained by four-point linear interpolation
[Ref 20: p. 882] from the data file 'TARGET' which is given in Appendix C
• the iterative subtraction process described previously is applied to determine the
number of targeted boosters in categories 10, 6, and 1
• the expected value and variance of RVHIT are computed
• the expected value of RVPEN is calculated
• the appropriate value of Z is applied in order to determine the limit of the
desired confidence interval for RVPEN.
Further details are elaborated in the program documentation in Appendix C.
The output shows, for each month, the number of platforms deployed, the
number of RV launched, the average number of RV that penetrate the layer, the
number of RV that penetrate with the required confidence level, and the year of the
engagement. The output produced for a system deployed starting in January 1994,
with KKV p(k) = .9 and security goal confidence level 99%, optimized for rninimum
necessary deployments to reach 2688, is displayed in Appendix D.
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IV. OPTIMIZATION
Having developed the MOE and a model to describe the relationship of the MOE
to the various inputs, the next step was to find values of the decision variables that
would result in an MOE value of less than 2688.
A. INPUTS
1. Fixed and Variable Parameters
As this study is structured, the forecast of Soviet ICBM and FBB development
and deployment is a fixed parameter which determines a particular targeting surface in
SBKKV x YEAR x RV space. While the threat forecast in this particular study would
permit the consideration of the effects of variations in the Soviet FBB deployment rate
after 1999,22 any variation which involved other missile deployment rates, or FBB
deployment rates before 1999, or.changed the launch timing or sequencing, or changed
the basing scheme, would require the generation of a new surface for the TARGET
file.
The single shot p(k) of the KKV is a variable parameter which affects system
effectiveness but is independent of the deployment rate. This p(k) may increase as a
result of further development if the start of system deployment is delayed. This study
will present results for p(k) = 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7 in order to demonstrate the sensitivity
of the results to the KKV p(k) value.
Another parameter which can be varied in this study is the degree of
confidence with which the SBKKV layer will be expected to perform. This study will
present sample results for a defender wanting 99% confidence that his MOE level will
not be exceeded, and for an attacker wanting 85% confidence that the defender's MOE
level will be exceeded. Note that 85% confidence for the attacker is the equivalent of
15% confidence for the defender.
2. Decision Variables
The start date for deployment of SBKKV has a significant impact on the
required rates of deployment to achieve the MOE. Once a threat forecast has been
made, the total number of SBKKV required for each year of the forecast is determined.
If the deployment date is delayed, there is no reason to expect the growth rate of the
22This is only because the inputs for this study assume that after 1999 only FBB
will be deployed.
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threat to slow. Delay in deployment start could allow such threat growth as to
transform the deployment of sufficient SBKKV to meet it into an almost impossible
task.
The other decision variables in this study are the annual rates of SBKKV
platform deployment. Once the other parameters and the start date are set, these
variables determine the number of SBKKV platforms in orbit for any given
engagement, and thus the number of RV arriving in midcourse, in any particular year
in the future. High deployment rates would certainly optimize the MOE, swiftly
driving the number of RV penetrating the SBKKV layer to a very low level. However,
there are other considerations.
In order to accomplish its mission, the SBKKV layer need not have zero
leakage. It may permit up to a specified maximum number of RV to penetrate, based
on the design capacity of the midcourse layer. Accordingly, an unnecessarily high
deployment rate might result in a misallocation of national resources.
Another factor which may impact on the deployment rate is the production
schedule for SBKKV and their platforms. Minimum required deployment rates may
change up or down from year to year. It would not be desirable to have the
production rates fluctuate widely. A gradual initiation of production would be
preferable, followed by acceleration to peak production, and then a tapering off as the
SBKKV are augmented by more advanced systems in the out-years.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Minimize
deployment ratej (i = 1994-2004)
subject to
where
RVPENj -. required MOE level < =
for all engagements after 1 1 months from start date
RVPEN. = ^deployment ratej, previous deployments,
confidence level, KKV p(k), surface, engagement year i).
Note that if the deployment rate for the first year is zero, that necessarily implies a
start date after that year. Note also that the constraint requires the attainment of the
full effectiveness level in the very first year of deployments, and that the changing
threat requires continuing deployments of SBKKV platforms to maintain that
effectiveness level. Under these conditions, static terms such as IOC and FOC have
little meaning.
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The solution to this optimization problem is the minimum number of SBKKV
platforms which would need to be deployed each year in order to meet the goals of the
defense (whether that goal is minimum deterrence or a high degree of positive security).
After these requirements are input to the programming and budgeting process, the
problem may be transformed into minimizing RVPEN subject to limits on SBKKV
platform deployment.23
C. BASIC RESULTS
The results displayed in Table 3 and Figure 4.1 show the minimum required
deployment rates to achieve the defender's security goal of 99% confidence that the
number of penetrating RV will be below 2688 by December 1994 and for each month
thereafter until December 2004. It is immediately clear that a KKV with a p(k) of .7 is
not worth its probable cost. A SBKKV system with a KKV p(k) of .8 would be able to
accomplish the mission through the year 2000, but would require more than 20,000
KKV (2,000 platforms) in 2001. A system with a KKV p(k) of .9 would be able to
accomplish the mission through 2004, but would require more than 20,000 KKV in
2005.
The results displayed in Table 4 and Figure 4.2 show the minimum required
deployment rates to achieve the defender's deterrence goal of 15% confidence that the
number of penetrating RV will be below 2688 by December 1994 and for each month
thereafter until December 2004. Since it is generally easier to deny victory to an
opponent than to ensure victory for oneself, it is not surprising that the deterrence
mission requires fewer platforms. The useful lives of the KKV p(k) = .7 system and
the KKV p(k) = .8 system are both extended two years, while the useful life of the
KKV p(k) = .9 system will likely be extended through the year 2005.
Whatever the parameters, examination of the minimum required launches in the
out-years (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2) indicates that, as increasing numbers of RV are
launched on FBB to evade the SBKKV, greater numbers of SBKKV are required to
intercept more of the RV from conventional ICBM. There is a diminishing marginal
return on SBKKV deployment after the year 2000, due to the requirement to achieve
more and more interceptions over a constant geographic area from a conventional
booster target population that is no longer growing.
This transformed problem resolves quickly into: Deploy as many platforms as
available as soon as possible in order to reduce RVPEN as much as possible.
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TABLE 3
MINIMUM REQUIRED PLATFORM DEPLOYMENTS TO ACHIEVE 2688
WITH 99% CONFIDENCE
YEAR 94 95 96
For KKV p(k) = 0.9:
YEARLY 168 108 132










00 01 02 03 04
120 168 192 198 492
876 1044 1236 1434 1926
For KKV p(k) = 0.8 :
YEARLY 198 150 180 234 234 276 216 594 over 2000
TOTAL 198 348 528 762 996 1272 1488 **** in Nov 2001
For KKV p(k) = 0.7 :
YEARLY 246 228 396 516 1092 over 2000
TOTAL 246 474 870 1386 **** in Jul 1998
TABLE 4 .
MINIMUM REQUIRED PLATFORM DEPLOYMENTS TO ACHIEVE 2688
WITH 15% CONFIDENCE
YEAR 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
For KKV p(k) = 0.9:
YEARLY 150 102
TOTAL 150 252
For KKV p(k) = 0.8 :
YEARLY 174 120
TOTAL 174 294




114 108 102 96 90 120 162 192 192
366 474 576 672 762 882 1044 1236 1428
150 156 198 162 210 204 486 594
444 600 798 960 1170 1374 1860 ****
234 336 378 504 696 over 2000
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The cumulative minimum deployment totals are not incidental sums of
previous years' deployments, but are absolutely determined by the parameters of the
targeting surface, the KKV p(k), and the confidence level. They are independent of the
start date. A one year delay, to January 1995, would mean zero deployments in 1994,
but the deferred 1994 deployments would have to be made up in order eventually to
meet the cumulative minimum number of platforms required at the end of each year.
It is not likely that the large number of platforms required by the end of 1995 could all
be launched in 1995, and thus the constraint in the optimization problem would be
violated. The goal date would have to be pushed back to the end of 1996, and thus a
one-year delay in starting to deploy causes a two-year additional delay in reaching the
desired level of effectiveness.24
2. "Smoothed" Deployments
Deploying at minimally effective rates has two disadvantages: It is inefficient
and it is very sensitive to disruption or delay of the launch schedule. It also requires a
large "down payment" in order to achieve the desired MOE level by the end of the first
year of deployment. In order to reduce the strain on the production and launch
systems at the beginning of deployment and to maintain efficient SBKKV production
schedules, it may be acceptable to relax the 11-month goal-achievement constraint and
to put off the MOE requirement for one year in order to smooth out the production
and launch rates over the years of deployment. Table 5 and Figure 4.3 show how this
might be done for the KKV p(k) = .9 system with a deterrence objective, accepting a
delay until December 1995 in meeting the effectiveness requirement in order to gain
smoother production and launch operations and provide a bit of deployment slack in
the out-years.
3. Use of the Space Shuttle
If the SBKKV platforms were to be launched by the Shuttle, then the
deployment rate of SBKKV per year would depend on the number of Shuttle launches
per year with platforms aboard, and the number of platforms which could be carried
on board a Shuttle. The Marshall Institute study assumes a KKV weight of 500
24For the p(k) = .9 system designed to deter, a one-year delay would call for 252
platforms deployed in 1995 to reach the MOE by the end of 1995, or a total of 366
platforms deployed in 1995 and 1996 to reach the MOE by the end of 1996. For less
capable systems and/or more higher standards of performance, the difficulty is even
greater.
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pounds, and a platform weight per KKV carried also of 500 pounds [Ref. 3: p. 9]. For
a 10 KKV per platform design, this implies 10,000 pounds for each complete platform.
Given a Shuttle cargo capacity of 30 tons [Ref. 21: p. 196], then 6 complete KKV
platforms could be lifted per Shuttle launched.25
The SDIO would not be the only Shuttle user: There will certainly be
competition from commercial and scientific payloads for Shuttle capacity. If we
assume that the original Shuttle launch schedule of 24 per year is eventually attained
[Ref. 22: p. 102] (thus permitting 24 x 6 = 144 platforms per year to be deployed), then
144 is an upper bound on the SBKKV deployment rate. Only the KKV p(k) = .9
system deployed to achieve the deterrence goal would be feasible within that constraint,
and then only with smoothing to reduce the requirements for launches in 1994, 2002,
2003, and 2004. See Table 5 and Figure '4.3
TABLE 5
SMOOTHED PLATFORM DEPLOYMENTS
For KKV p(k) = 0.9 and 15% confidence level:
YEAR 94 95 96 97 98 99
YEARLY 108 144 132 132 132 132
TOTAL 108 252 366 474 576 672
00 01 02 03 04
132 132 132 132 120
762 882 1044 1236 1428
25Although military equipment loaded aboard transport aircraft usually fills the
available space before the aircraft's weight limit is reached, much of the volume in
military vehicles is crew space. An SBKKV platform, needing no crew space, will
require less volume per pound.
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Figure 4.3 YEARLY AND CUMULATIVE SMOOTHED DEPLOYMENT.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The measure of effectiveness for each layer of a BMD must be the absolute number
of RV that penetrate it. Percentages do not remain constant: 90% of 5000 RV is only
45% of 10,000 RV, and a 90% that is sufficient in 199X will not be sufficient in 199X
+ 4. Furthermore, percentages are not real: Assumptions about the numbers and
characteristics of future RV in possible attacks give designers and system architects
something to work with, while requirements to intercept X% of attacking boosters give
them a firm grasp of nothing. Percentages are interesting numbers derived from
engagement simulation results, but should not drive architecture or system designs. It
is worth noting that the mission to allow a maximum of 2688 RV (with 99%
confidence) through the layer was accomplished in this study by the p(k) = .9 system
by destroying between 39 and 72% of the RV launched at it, depending on the year.
When forecasting deployment requirements, the Use of the expected value of system
performance is inadequate. If the goal is positive control over security, the expected
value approach will not require enough platforms. If the goal is merely reduction of an
attacker's confidence of success, the expected value approach will require too many
platforms. Random effects demand that one-sided confidence intervals be used to
represent system performance.
Any decision to develop or deploy a BMD should consider system effectiveness
throughout its lifetime. The p(k) = .7 system was initially capable, but in the face of a
growing threat it became quickly unsatisfactory. The failure of an adversary to hold
still has brought many a nation to grief in the past.
A year-by-year forecast of performance also alerts decisionmakers to potential
problems. If the p(k) = .9 system were to be deployed at the minimum rate for the
deterrence mission, it would be able to accomplish this mission throughout the
1994-2004 timeframe. Yet if the Shuttle were to be the primary launch system, then the
mission could not be accomplished at minimum deployment rates in 1994 nor in the
years 2002 and beyond. The forecast having signalled the problem in the out-years, it
could be solved within the capabilities of the Shuttle schedule by smoothing and
accelerating earlier deployments (see Table 5).
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The results of this study indicate that the U.S. will have to vastly expand its space
launch capacity by the time SBKKV deployments begin. Even a KKV p(k) = .9 system
at the 15% confidence level would use 90% of the available Shuttle launches for 11
years. There must be, by 1994, alternate Medium and/or Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicles
for SDIO's use. The methodology developed in this study to forecast deployment
requirements can help drive the design and procurement of such systems by forecasting
the amount of lift capacity needed over a period of time. Possible relief from this
requirement could come from relaxation of the required level of effectiveness,26 or by
reducing the required degree of confidence in attaining the desired level of effectiveness,
or by increasing the capability of the system, or if the threat were less. It should be
remembered, however, that the threat scenario used for this study was not the worst
possible case.
As was indicated by the increasing requirement for deployments to maintain RV
penetration below 2688 after the year 2000, introduction of FBB by the U.S.S.R. will
eventually make a defense based on SBKKV too costly. Although the SBKKV will have
provided adequate protection for up to 10 years, by 2005 even a p(k) = .9 system will
be inadequate for security. Some means will have to be found in the time bought by
the SBKKV to defeat the FBB. Indeed, if it is discovered that KKV p(k) or overall
system reliability will not be high enough, or deployments cannot be made soon or fast
enough, or the threat is changing even faster, then SBKKV may not be as attractive as
they seem today, and resources might be better employed to develop other
technologies.
Serious ballistic missile defense will require a long-term national commitment to
maintain production and deployment on schedule. The effects of a one-year delay in the
start date demonstrate the consequences of failing to meet minimum requirements.
Even for the p(k) = .9 system a deployment delayed would never be recovered without
much greater launch and production capacity, and a decision to stretch out deployment
"just one more year" would put an excessive and continuing burden on the downstream
layers of the defense. The ultimate result would be more final leakage of nuclear
warheads onto U.S. territory. This must be clearly understood by all those involved in
the decision-making process through the lifetime of the system.
The procedure demonstrated in this study will enable analysts to quickly compare
different systems and alternative futures for decision-makers. Given a threat forecast
and any model of the performance of a BMD system or layer, an interception surface
26This would, of course, increase the load on the midcourse layer.
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in WEAPON x YEAR x RV space can be generated, to whatever accuracy is desired or
possible. Once this surface exists, the results of various deployment alternatives can be





























number of boosters of category i intercepted by KKV
ballistic missile defense
number of boosters of category i targeted by KKV
Fast-Burn booster








single-shot probability of kill
reentry vehicle
number of RV on a booster of category i
total number of RV destroyed by KKV interceptions
number of RV on boosters of category i destroyed by KKV
total number of RV launched in an engagement
total number of RV which penetrate the SBKKV layer
total number of RV on targeted boosters
Strategic Defense Initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
space-based kinetic kill vehicle
submarine-launched ballistic missile
surface-to-surface (U.S. prefix: designates SoviefclCBM)
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APPENDIX B
THREAT SCENARIO FOR BASIC MODEL
The ICBM mix which was input to the RAND model to generate the basic 36





1994 1995 1999 2004
SS-18 200 (2000) 200 (2000) 200 (2000) 200 (2000)
SS-19 240 (1440) 240 (1440) 240 (1440) 240 (1440)
SS-24 40 (400) 80 (800) 320 (3200) 320 (3200)
SS-25 120 (120) 180 (180) 200 (200) 200 (200)
SS-18FO 40 (400) 60 (600) 120 (1200) 120 (1200)
FBB (0) 60 (180) 110 (330) 550 (1650)
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APPENDIX C
PROGRAM AND INPUT FILES
C SBKKV EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM -- SEPTEMBER 1987
C CPT FREDERICK W. WEBER, JR., U.S. ARMY
C NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
C INPUT FILE DEFINITIONS:
C FILEDEF 11 DISK TARGET DATA A
C FILEDEF 12 DISK LAUNCH DATA A
C FILEDEF 13 DISK DEPLRATE DATA A
C OUTPUT FILE DEFINITION:
C FILEDEF 14 DISK OUTPUT LISTING A
C THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES AN UPPER LIMIT (GIVEN A SPECIFIC
C STATISTICAL CONFIDENCE LEVEL) FOR THE NUMBER OF
C ATTACKING NUCLEAR WARHEAD REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH WILL
C PENETRATE A LAYER OF SATELLITE PLATFORMS CARRYING
C SPACE-BASED KINETIC KILL VEHICLES.
C THE PROGRAM DEPENDS ON THE INPUT FILE 'TARGET' WHICH REPRESENTS
C A SURFACE IN SBKKV X YEAR X RV SPACE.
C THE DATA IN THE 'TARGET' FILE CAN BE GENERATED BY ANY METHOD OR
C MODEL ACCEPTABLE TO THE USER OF THIS PROGRAM.
C THE 'LAUNCH' FILE CONTAINS DATA DESCRIBING THE NUMBER AND BOOSTER
C MIX OF THE ATTACKING RV FOR THE YEARS OF THE FORECAST WHICH WAS
C USED TO GENERATE THE 'TARGET' SURFACE.
C THE 'DEPLRATE' FILE CONTAINS DATA DESCRIBING THE YEARLY DEPLOYMENT
C RATES OF THE SBKKV PLATFORMS.
C THE PROGRAM IS PRESENTED HERE WITH A DEPLOYMENT START DATE OF
C JANUARY 1994 AND A KKV P(K) OF 0.9. THESE VALUES MAY BE CHANGED
C TO REFLECT A DIFFERENT SCENARIO.
C AFTER PROGRAM EXECUTION, THE OUTPUT FILE WILL CONTAIN, FOR EACH
C MONTH, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SBKKV PLATFORMS ON STATION, THE
C TOTAL NUMBER OF RV WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED ACCORDING TO THE
C THREAT SCENARIO, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF RV WHICH WOULD PENETRATE
C THE LAYER, THE MAXIMUM NUMBER (FOR THE GIVEN CONFIDENCE LEVEL)
C OF RV WHICH WOULD PENETRATE THE LAYER, AND THE YEAR IN WHICH
C THE ENGAGEMENT OCCURRED.
C INPUT
:
C THE 'TARGET' FILE CONTAINS 21 ROWS (REFLECTING TO 2000 SBKKV
C PLATFORMS, IN INCREMENTS OF 100) AND 12 COLUMNS (REFLECTING THE
C YEARS 1993-2004). ITS CELLS CONTAIN THE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS WHICH
C WOULD BE TARGETED BY A SBKKV LAYER OF GIVEN CAPABILITIES
C IF A GIVEN ATTACK WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE YEAR AND AGAINST
C THE NUMBER OF SBKKV WHICH INDEX EACH CELL.
C THE 'LAUNCH' FILE CONTAINS THE NUMBER OF ATTACKING RV FORECAST
C FOR EACH CATEGORY OF MISSILE IN EACH YEAR OF THE SCENARIO. DUE TO
C THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TARGET DATA SOURCE MODEL,
C RV ARE NOT CLASSIFIED IN THIS PROGRAM BY SPECIFIC ICBM MODEL, BUT
C ONLY BY THE NUMBER OF RV CARRIED ABOARD THE ICBM (THUS, RV FROM
C THE 10-WARHEAD SS-18 AND SS-24 ARE LUMPED TOGETHER IN THIS FILE).
C THE 'DEPLRATE' FILE CAN BE CHANGED TO REFLECT DIFFERENT
C DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THEIR EFFECTS ON THE
C EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAYER.
C OTHER USER-DETERMINED INPUTS ARE THE KKV P(K), THE CONFIDENCE
C LEVEL TO BE USED, AND THE STARTING YEAR. THESE VALUES ARE SET
C BY CHANGING THE VALUES IN THE DATA STATEMENT.
C THE DETAILS OF THE ALGORITHM ARE DISCUSSED IN THE COMMENTS AT
C EACH STATEMENT.
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C GLOSSARY OF VARIABLE NAMES:
C A = FRACTIONS OF A YEAR. USED FOR INTERPOLATION AT 140, 160
C AVPEN(I) = EXPECTED VALUE OF NUMBER OF RV PENETRATING THE
C LAYER IN A GIVEN ENGAGEMENT I
C B = FRACTIONS OF 100 PLATFORMS. USED FOR INTERPOLATION AT 160
C COL = IDENTIFIES CORRECT COLUMN IN LAUNCH AND TARGET DATA FILES
C DPLOYD(I) = REAL NUMBER OF SBKKV PLATFORMS DEPLOYED
C ERVHIT = EXPECTED NUMBER OF RV DESTROYED
C INDEX = ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF THE MONTH BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS START
C KOUNT = ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF THE MONTH FOR WHICH A RESULT IS
C BEING CALCULATED
C LAUNCH (I, J) = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED IN YEAR I
C BY CATEGORY OF ICBM J
C LNCH1 = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED ON SS-25'S
C LNCH3 = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED ON FBB '
S
C LNCH6 = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED ON SS-19'S
C LNCH10 = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED ON SS-18'S, SS-24'S, SS-18FO'S
C MAXPEN(I) = UPPER BOUNDARY OF CONFIDENCE INTERVAL FOR RVPEN
C MINHIT = LOWER BOUNDARY OF CONFIDENCE INTERVAL FOR NUMBER OF
C RV DESTROYED
C MINPEN = NUMBER OF RV THAT GET CLEAN AWAY WITHOUT EVEN
C BEING TARGETED
C MONTH = WITHIN 'YEAR,' THE MONTH THAT DEPLOYMENTS BEGIN
C P = INDIVIDUAL KKV PROBABILITY OF KILL, GIVEN FIRED AT A BOOSTER
C RATE (I) = NUMBER OF SBKKV PLATFORMS LAUNCHED IN A GIVEN YEAR
C RVLNCH(I) = NUMBER OF RV LAUNCHED IN A GIVEN ATTACK WITHIN A YEAR
C RVTGT = TOTAL NUMBER OF RV ON ALL TARGETED ICBM
C SOFAR(I) = INTEGER NUMBER OF SBKKV PLATFORMS DEPLOYED IN MONTH I




C TARGET (I, J) = NUMBER OF RV ON BOARD ICBM TARGETED BY KKV, IN
C YEAR I AND FOR A GIVEN NUMBER J OF SBKKV PLATFORMS
C TGT1 = NUMBER OF TARGETED ICBM CARRYING 1 RV (I.E., SS-25)
C TGT6 = NUMBER OF ICBM CARRYING 6 RV (I.E., SS-19)
C TGT10 = NUMBER OF ICBM CARRYING 10 RV (I.E., SS-18, SS-24, SS-18FO
C VRVHIT = VARIANCE OF NUMBER OF RV DESTROYED
C YEAR = YEAR THAT SBKKV PLATFORM DEPLOYMENTS BEGIN
C Z = VALUE OF THE STANDARD NORMAL RANDOM VARIABLE CORRESPONDING TO
C THE DESIRED CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
C THERE IS NO TGT3 VARIABLE, AS THE MODEL INDICATED THAT NO FBB
C WOULD EVER GET HIT.
10 INTEGER AVPEN, COL, INDEX, LNCH1 , LNCH3, LNCH6 , LNCH10, MAXPEN,
1MINPEN, MONTH, ROW, RVLNCH, RVTGT, SOFAR, TARGET, TGT1 , TGT6
,
2TGT10, YEAR
20 REAL A, B, DPLOYD, ERVHIT, P, RATE, START, VRVHIT, Z
C DIMENSIONING STARTS WITH OTH ELEMENTS TO ALLOW FOR CONDITIONS
C PRIOR TO 1994 OR WHEN SBKKV PLATFORMS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED.
30 DIMENSION DPLOYD (0 : 132) , HISURV(0 :132) , LAUNCH(1 :4,0 :11)
,
1 RATE(1994:2005), TARGET(0 :20,0 :11) ,SOFAR(0 :132) ,RVLNCH(0 :132)
,
2AVPEN(0:132), MAXPEN(0 :132)
C INPUTS CAN BE MODIFIED HERE.
40 DATA P/0.9/,*Z/2.327/, START/ 1994. 01/
50 READ (11, '(1215)') ( (TARGET(I , J) , J=0,11), 1=0,20)
READ (12, '(1215)0 ( (LAUNCH(I , J) , J=0,ll), 1=1,4)
READ (13, ' (12F5.1) 1 ) (RATE(I), 1=1994,2005)
C IF EXPLORING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES AFTER SOME NUMBER OF
C PLATFORMS ALREADY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED, THESE VARIABLES SHOULD
C BE INITIALIZED AT THAT NUMBER, RATHER THAN ZERO.
51
60 DPLOYD(O) = 0.
SOFAR(O) =
C THE START DATE CAN BE VARIED TO EXPLORE DIFFERENT ALTERNATIVES.
C THE VARIABLES 'YEAR' AND 'MONTH' ONLY APPEAR HERE. THEIR PURPOSE
C IS ONLY TO CLARIFY THE DERIVATION OF THE VARIABLE 'INDEX.'
C THE VARIABLE 'INDEX' SETS A REFERENCE MONTH BETWEEN DECEMBER 1993
C AND DECEMBER 2004 FOR COUNTING PURPOSES.
70 YEAR = INT (START)
MONTH = NINT(100 * (START - YEAR))
INDEX = (12 * YEAR) + MONTH - 1
C THIS LOOP GENERATES THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SBKKV PLATFORMS
C DEPLOYED IN ANY MONTH BETWEEN THE START OF DEPLOYMENTS AND
C DECEMBER 2004. 24060 IS EXACTLY 12 X 2005. 2005 IS THE
C LIMIT BECAUSE THE THREAT FORECAST ONLY EXTENDS TO 2004.
C FOR A FORECAST ENDING OTHER THAN IN 2004, THIS VALUE WOULD
C BECOME: 12 X (END YEAR +1).
80 DO 90 KOUNT = INDEX, 24060
DPLOYD(l+KOUNT- INDEX) = (RATE (KOUNT/ 12) / 12.)
1 + DPLOYD( KOUNT-INDEX)
SOFAR(l+KOUNT-INDEX) = NINT (DPLOYD(l+KOUNT- INDEX)
)
90 CONTINUE
C THIS LOOP GENERATES THE NUMBER OF RV PENETRATING THE SBKKV LAYER.
C THIS LOOP CYCLES ONCE FOR EACH MONTH BETWEEN THE START OF
C DEPLOYMENT AND THE LIMITS OF THE RV DESTRUCTION DATA.
110 DO 250 KOUNT = INDEX, 24060
C THIS STOPS THE CYCLING WHEN THE NUMBER OF PLATFORMS EXCEEDS 2000.
120 IF (SOFAR(KOUNT-INDEX) - 2000) 130, 130, 260
C THESE VALUES ARE CALCULATED TO SIMPLIFY THE INTERPOLATIONS IN
C STATEMENTS 140 AND 160
130 COL = (KOUNT / 12) - 1994
A = MOD (KOUNT,. 12) / 12.
ROW SOFAR( KOUNT- INDEX) / 100
B = (SOFAR( KOUNT- INDEX) - 100 * ROW)/ 100.
C THESE ARE THE MONTHLY INTERPOLATIONS FOR RV LAUNCHED.
140 LNCH1 = NINT(((1 - A) * LAUNCH (4. COL ) ) + (A * LAUNCH ( 4. COL+1) )
)
LNCH3 = NINT(((1 - A) * LAUNCH (3 , COL ) ) + (A * LAUNCH (3 , COL+1)
)
'
LNCH6 = NINT(((1 - A) * LAUNCH ( 2 , COL ) ) + (A * LAUNCH( 2, COL+1)
)
LNCH10 = NINT(((1 - A) * LAUNCH(1 ,COL) ) + (A* LAUNCH(1 , COL+1 )
RVLNCH( KOUNT- INDEX) = LNCH1 + LNCH3 + LNCH6 + LNCH10
C THIS IS THE FOUR-POINT INTERPOLATION REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER III,
C SECTION C, SUBSECTION 2 "PROGRAMMING."
160 RVTGT = NINT ((TARGET (ROW, COL) * (1 . - A - B + (A * B) )
)
1 + (TARGET (ROW, COL + 1 ) * (A - (A * B) )
)
2 J' + (TARGET (ROW + l,COL) * (B - (A * B)))
3 + (TARGET(ROW-+ l,COL + 1) * (A * B)))
170 MINPEN = RVLNCH(KOUNT-INDEX) - RVTGT
180 IF (MINPEN .GE. (LNCH3 + LNCH1 + LNCH6)) THEN




TGT10 = NINT((LNCH10 -
1 (MINPEN - (LNCH3 + LNCH1 + LNCH6))) / 10.)
GO TO 240
190 ELSE IF (MINPEN .GE. (LNCH3 + LNCH1)) THEN
C ALL 10-RV AND SOME 6-RV BOOSTERS HAVE BEEN TARGETED.
TGT1 =
TGT6 = NINT((LNCH6 - (MINPEN - (LNCH3 + LNCH1))) / 6.)
TGT10 = NINT(LNCH10 / 10.)
GO TO 240
200 ELSE
C ALL 10-RV AND 6-RV, AND SOME 1-RV, HAVE BEEN TARGETED
TGT1 = LNCH1 - (MINPEN - LNCH3)
TGT6 = NINT(LNCH6 / 6.)
TGT10 = NINT(LNCH10 / 10.)
ENDIF
C HERE ARE CALCULATED THE PARAMETERS OF THE NORMAL RANDOM VARIABLE
C RVHIT. THESE ARE USED TO DETERMINE THE AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM NUMBER
C OF RV WHICH PENETRATE THE LAYER.
240 ERVHIT = P * ((10 * TGT10) + (6 * TGT6) + TGT1)
VRVHIT = P * (1 - P) * ((100 * TGT10) + (36 * TGT6) + TGT1)
AVPEN(KOUNT- INDEX) = NINT(RVLNCH(KOUNT- INDEX) - ERVHIT)
MAXPEN(KOUNT-INDEX) = RVLNCH(KOUNT- INDEX) -
1 NINT (ERVHIT - (Z * SQRT (VRVHIT) )
)
C END OF LOOP
250 CONTINUE
C SET UP OUTPUT HEADINGS
260 WRITE (14, 270)
C NOTE THAT THE COLUMN LISTED AS MAXPEN WILL BECOME MINHIT IF Z
C IS LESS THAN ZERO.
270 FORMAT ('0', 'PLATFORMS RVLAUNCH AVPEN MAXPEN YEAR')
C OUTPUT
280 WRITE (14, 290) (SOFAR(I), RVLNCH(I), AVPEN(I), MAXPEN(I),
1 (YEAR + ((I - 1) / 12)), I = 1, KOUNT - INDEX- 1)




The following is the TARGET -DATA file referred to in the program. It contains
the 220 points developed from the original 36, as well as a column of RV targeted for
1993 and a row of RV targeted when no KKV are deployed.
1340 1340 1350 1370 1400 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
2330 2340 2373 2429 2508 2610 2610 2610 2610 2610 2610
3040 3130 3240 3370 3520 3690 3690 3690 3690 3690 3690
3435 3622 3840 4090 4372 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684
3700 3990 4314 4672 5064 5490 5490 5490 5490 5490 5490
3887 4223 4602 5024 5490 5998 5998 5998 5998 5998 5998
4010 4370 4783 5249 5768 6340 6340 6340 6340 6340 6340
4113 4530 4993 5501 6055 6654 6654 6654 6654 6654 6654
4191 4637 5126 5659 6234 6853 6853 6853 6853 6853 6853
4260 4750 5274 5832 6424 7050 7050 7050 7050 7050 7050
4299 4805 5347 5925 6539 7189 7189 7189 7189 7189 7189
4329 4868 5441 6047 6687 7360 7360 7360 7360 7360 7360
4340 4900 5497 6131 6802 7510 7510 7510 7510 7510 7510
4345 4941 5570 6233 6932 7665 7665 7665 7665 7665 7665
4350 4950 5591 6273 6996 7760 7760 7760 7760 7760 7760
4352 4964 5616 6309 7041 7814 7814 7814 7814 7814 7814
4354 4978 5641 6344 7086 7868 7868 7868 7868 7868 7868
4356 4992 5667 6380 7132 7922 7922 7922 7922 7922 7922
4358 5006 5692 6415 7177 7976 7976 7976 7976 7976 7976
4360 5020 5717 6451 7222 8030 8030 8030 8030 8030 8030
• The following is the LAUNCH DATA input file which contains the number of
warheads launched on each aggregate type of ICBM (10, 6, 3, or 1) for each year from
1993 to 2004.
2400 2800 3400 4170 4900 5660 6400 6400 6400 6400 6400 6400
1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
180 216 255 291 330 594 858 1122 1386 1650
60 120 180 185 190 195 200 200 200 200 200 200
The input file DEPLRATE DATA contains whatever deployment sequence the
analyst wishes to examine. The output in Appendix C was generated from the above
program with the following DEPLRATE DATA file:
168. 108. 132. 108. 138. 102. 120. 168. 192. 198. 492. 00.
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE OUTPUT FROM PROGRAM
This appendix presents the output of the program when the deployment rates for
the p(k) = .9 system are minimized while still achieving 99% confidence that the
security goal of 2688 RVPEN will be achieved.
PLATFORMS RVLAUNCH AVPEN MAXPEN YEAR
14 3938 3920 3930 1994
28 3977 3923 3940 1994
42 4015 3889 3915 1994
56 4053 3828 3863 1994
70 4092 3741 3785 1994
84 4130 3626 3678 1994
98 4168 3475 3536 1994
112 4207 3334 3403 1994
126 4245 3165 3241 1994
140 4283 2978 3062 1994
154 4322 2774 2866 1994
168 4360 2551 2650 1994
177 4430 2540 2641 1995
186 4500 2529 2632 1995
195 4570 2518 2623 1995
204 4640 2516 2623 1995
213 4710 2523 2632 1995
222 4780 2530 2640 1995
231 4850 2537 2649 1995
240 4920 2544 2657 1995
249 4990 2542 2657 1995
258 5060 2549 2666 1995
267 5130 2556 2674 1995
276 5200 2554 2674 1995
287 5267 2531 2653 1996
298 5335 2518 2642 1996
309 5403 2523 2648 1996
320 5471 2528 2654 1996
331 5538 2532 2660 1996
342 5606 2537 2666 1996
353 5673 2532 2662 1996
364 5740 2536 2668 1996
375 5809 2533 2666 1996
386 5876 2528 2663 1996
397 5944 2524 2660 1996
408 6011 2519 2657 1996
417 6075 2529 2668 1997
426 6140 2531 2671 1997
435 6205 2533 2674 1997
444 6269 2534 2676 1997
453 6333 2535 2678 1997
462 6399 2538 2683 1997
471 6463 2530 2676 1997
480 6527 2531 2678 1997
489 6592 2524 2672 1997
498 6655 2515 2665 1997
507 6721 2518 2669 1997
516 6785 2528 2680 1997
528 6851 2522 2675 1998
539 6919 2527 2681 1998
551 6985 2521 2676 1998
562 7052 2516 2673 1998
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574 7119 2511 2669 1998
585 7186 2506 2665 1998
597 7252 2500 2660 1998
608 7319 2495 2657 1998
620 7386 2499 2662 1998
631 7452 2502 2666 1998
643 7520 2507 2672 1998
654 7586 2510 2676 1998
663 7651 2512 2679 1999
671 7716 2514 2682 1999
680 7782 2512 2681 1999
688 7848 2513 2683 1999
697 7912 2512 2683 1999
705 7979 2514 2686 1999
714 8044 2514 2687 1999
722 8108 2514 2687 1999
731 8174 2506 2681 1999
739 8239 2506 2682 1999
748 8305 2507 2684 1999
756 8370 2507 2685 1999
766 8392 2497 2675 2000
776 8414 2492 2670 2000
786 8436 2487 2665 2000
796 8458 2482 2661 2000
806 8480 2482 2661 2000
816 8502 2483 2662 2000
826 8524 2489 2668 2000
836 8546 2494 2674 2000
846 8568 2495 2674 2000
856 8590 2501 2680 2000
866 8612 2506 2686 2000
876 8634 2507 2687 2000
890 8656 2507 2687 2001
904 8678 2502 2683 2001
918 8700 2503 2683 2001
932 8722 2498 2678 2001
946 8744 2493 2674 2001
960 8766 2493 2674 2001
974 8788 2488 2670 2001
988 8810 2488 2670 2001
1002 8832 2483 2665 2001
1016 8854 2489 2671 2001
1030 8876 2495 2677 2001
1044 8898 2495 2678 2001
1060 8920 2501 2684 2002
1076 8942 2502 2684 2002
1092 8964 2502 2685 2002
1108 8986 2502 2686 2002
1124 9008 2503 2686 2002
1140 9030 2498 2681 2002
1156 9052 2493 2677 2002
1172 9074 2493 2677 2002
1188 9096 2488 2672 2002
1204 9118 2489 2673 2002
1220 9140 2489 2674 2002
1236 9162 2489 2674 2002
1253 9184 2490 2675 2003
1269 9206 2490 2675 2003
1286 9228 2485 2671 2003
1302 9250 2486 2671 2003
1319 9272 2486 2672 2003
1335 9294 2486 2672 2003
1352 9316 2481 2668 2003
1368 9338 2482 2668 2003
1385 9360 2482 2669 2003
1401 9382 2483 2669 2003
1418 9404 2488 2675 2003
1434 9426 2500 2687 2003
1475 9448 2484 2671 2004
1516 9470 2479 2666 2004
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1557 9492 2479 2667 2004
1598 9514 2480 2668 2004
1639 9536 2485 2674 2004
1680 9558 2487 2675 2004
1721 9580 2489 2677 2004
1762 9602 2491 2679 2004
1803 9624 2492 2681 2004
1844 9646 2495 2683 2004
1885 9668 2497 2685 2004




The initial insight of Section III-A can be extended to provide a graphic estimate
of SBKKV platform deployment requirements, using two first quadrants which share a
common axis.
The surface of RV penetrating the SBKKV layer, described in SBKKV x YEAR x
RV space, can be projected into the SBKKV x RV plane as a set of level curves
labelled by year. This occurs in a first quadrant because all values are positive, with
SBKKV as the X-axis, and RVPEN as the Y-axis. The total number of SBKKV
needed in any particular year can be derived by extending a line from the maximum
permissible level of RVPEN parallel to the SBKKV axis. The intersections of this line
with the labelled level curves will have coordinates ( SBKKV , RVPENMAX), thus
identifying for each year the number of SBKKV required.
If this "first* first quadrant were to be rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise, the
SBKKV axis would become the Y-axis for a "second" first quadrant graph, with YEAR
as the new positive X-axis. The SBKKV
r
points on the SBKKV axis could be used
to identify points with coordinates (YEAR, SBKKV ) in the YEAR x SBKKV
quadrant. The trace of these points graphically illustrates the pace of SBKKV
deployment required.
This relationship is demonstrated in Figure E.l with the assumption of p(k) =
1.0, that is RVPEN = RVLNCH - RVTGT. Yet it would not be too difficult to
generate level curves in the SBKKV x RV plane from the program in Appendix C
which reflected a p(k) less than 1.0 and a desired confidence level.
This sort of graphic display would be of greatest value when demonstrating to
decisionmakers the direct consequences for RVPEN from their decisions about
deployment rates.
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Figure E.l GRAPHIC PLANNING TOOL.
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